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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate of/ 
CORA E. FENNER, ~ Case No. 8474 
Deceased.\ 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Cora E. Fenner died testate on the 1Oth day of Feb-
ruary, 1952. Her will was admitted to probate in the 
District Court of Weber County, State of Utah, and let-
ters testamentary were issued to Fred William Hill and 
James Edward Willey, the named executors, on the 17th 
day of March, 1952. 
Cora E. Fenner was the surviving wife and widow of 
Walter E. Fenner who died testate on the 19th day of 
November, 1951. By his last will and testament, Walter 
E. Fenner devised and bequeathed all of his property to 
his wife, Cora E. Fenner. The Estate of Walter E. Fen-
ner, including joint tenancies, amounted to approximately 
$250,000.00. The executors in Walter E. Fenner Estate 
paid a Utah State Inheritance Tax in excess of $12,500.00. 
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Walter E. Fenner had life insurance in excess of 
$40,000.00, $35,000.00 of which was with the Equitable 
Life Assurance Society of the United States, and $5,000.00 
with the New York Life Insurance Company. 
Cora E. Fenner converted the New York Life Insur-
ance policy into a certificate of indebtedness and drew 
down two policies of the Equitable Life Assurance Society 
in cash in the sum of $15,786.29, which was deposited in 
her checking account on the 9th day of January, 1952. 
Cora E. Fenner was dying from a malignant cancer, 
and this large check was the only check that she endorsed 
after the first day of January, 1952. 
The Fenner's had no children. Cora and Walter E. 
Fenner were distant cousins. They made their money 
out of ranching, cattle and sheep business in Wyoming. 
Walter E. Fenner came to Wyoming when he was a 
small child many years ago. He had lost track of his 
family and grew up in Wyoming largely with Mrs. Fen-
ner's relatives as his friends. The persons designated as 
secondary beneficiaries were in truth and fact Cora E. 
Fenner's nieces and nephews. and not Walter E. Fenner's 
nieces and nephews. 
Walter E. Fenner died suddenly of a heart attack.· 
Prior to his death he had been working on the revamping 
of his life insurance set up, and upon his death Mrs. Fen-
ner drew her will in the light of the wishes of Mr. Fenner. 
The second ·paragraph of Mrs. Fenner's will is an 
embodiment of his life insurance program if it had been 
carried out. The residuary bequests under Mrs. Fenner's 
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will are substantially the same as the residuary bequest in 
Walter E. Fenner's will if he had survived Mrs. Fenner. 
Mrs. Fenner's will and codicil thereto were both executed 
in December, 1951. 
I recite the foregoing facts large I y for their human 
interest. 
Upon the death of Walter E. Fenner, Mrs. Fenner 
filed the conventional proof of the death of Walter E. 
Fenner. She did not exercise either of the privileges 
granted to her in the policies in issue. 
The Equitable Life Assurance Society received the 
proof of death upon these policies and set them up as a 
death claim, as of December 28, 1951. 
In the latter part of January, 1952, the Equitable Life 
Assurance Society mailed to Mrs. Fenner checks covering 
the interest on these policies from date of death to Decem-
ber 28, 1951, and interest from December 28, 1951, to 
January 28, 1952. These checks were not cashed by Mrs. 
Fenner, but subsequently were returned and the amounts 
were paid to the executors of her estate. 
In due time the executors of Cora E. Fenner's Estate 
made its inheritance tax report to the Court and Tax 
Commission and included as being subject to inheritance 
tax the small interest i terns but did not include the prin-
cipal fund. 
As a death claim policy No. 3569738 was the sum of 
$10,531.92 with interest commencing January 28, 1952. 
As a death claim Policy No. 3569739 was the sum of 
$5,265.93 with interest commencing January 28, 1952. 
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As a death claim Policy No. 3569740 was the sum of 
$5,265.93 with interest commencing January 28, 1952. 
Quite naturally there have been discussions between 
the Tax Commission Attorneys and the writer as to the 
taxability of these funds held by the insurance company 
as death claims. 
1he Tax Commission procured an order for the exec-
utors to show cause why these funds so held by the in-
surance company should not be included in the inherit-
ance tax report as taxable. 
The executors filed an answer and attached to the 
·answer pertinent extracts of these aforesaid policies. These 
are designated as Exhibits A, B, and C, and are specific-
ally concerning the named beneficiaries and the mode of 
settlement and are in each case entitled "Special Pro-
. . '' VISIOn • 
I will use the provisions of Policy No. 3569738 as be-
ing an example. It reads as follows: 
"SPECIAL PROVISION: 
In compliance with the written request of the Insured, 
the beneficiary and mode of settlement are changed as 
follows: 
· 1. It is hereby specially provided that the settlement of 
the ·amount becoming due by reason of the death of the 
Insured shall be made with the Insured's wife, CORA E. 
FENNER, if living, as provided in paragraph 2, if not 
living, such amount shall be divided into the number of 
equal shares that will provide: 
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One share for each of the Insured's nieces, Stella 
Wright Willey, Flora Wright Streight, Melvina Wright 
Downs and Jessica Wright, who may then be surviving, 
and each such share shall be paid in a single sum to such 
respective niece, and 
One share for the then surviving children of each 
said niece of the Insured who may not then be surviving, 
and each such share shall be paid in a single sum in equal 
shares to such children of said deceased niece, and 
One share for each of the Insured's nephews, Robert 
G. Wright and Meral E. Wright, who may then be sur-
viving, and each such share shall be paid in a single sum 
to such respective nephew, and 
One share for the then surviving children of each said 
nephew of the Insured who may not then be surviving, 
and each such share shall be paid in a single sum in equal 
shares to such children of said deceased nephew. 
2. The amount becoming due to the Insured's said wife 
under paragraph 1 shall be left on deposit with the So-
ciety in accordance with Option 1 of the Modes of Settle-
ment at Maturity of Policy during her lifetime, interest 
payable monthly, except that said wife shall have the 
following privileges: 
(a) On an interest due date of withdrawing the 
amount held on deposit, or 
(b) At any time of having the amount held on 
deposit paid as a life income in accordance 
with Option 3 of the said Modes of Settle-
ment. 
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In the event of the death of the Insured's said wife, sub-
sequent to the death of the Insured but before the amount 
shall have been paid, the amount held under said Option 
1, together with any interest accrued thereon, or the com-
muted value of any unpaid CERTAIN installments under 
Option 3, as the case may be, shall be divided into the 
number of equal shares that will provide: 
One share for each of the Insured's said nieces who 
may then be surviving, and each such share shall be paid 
in a single sum to such respective niece, and 
One share for the then surviving children of each said 
. niece of the Insured who may not then be surviving, and 
each such share shall be paid in a single sum in equal 
shares to such children of said deceased niece, and 
One share for each of the Insured's said nephews who 
may then be surviving, and each such share shall be paid 
in a single sum to such respective nephew, and 
One share for the then surviving children of each said 
nephe\v of the Insured who may not then be surviving, 
and each such share shall be paid in a single ~urn in equal 
shares to such children of said deceased nephew. 
Should none of the Insured's said nieces, no children 
of the Insured's said nieces, 'neither of the Insured's 
said nephews and no children of the Insured's said 
nephews be surviving at the death of the Insured's said 
wife, as aforesaid, the amount held under said Option 1, 
together with any interest accrued thereon, or the com-
muted value of any unpaid CERTAIN installments under 
said Option 3, as the case may be, shall be paid in a 
single sum to said wife's executors or administrators. 
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3. Payment of any sum withdrawable hereunder at the 
option of a beneficiary may be deferred by the Society for 
a period not exceding ninety days after receipt of applica-
tion therefor. 
New York, June 20, 1933." 
Said policy also contains a paragraph which reads as 
follows: 
"Modes of Settlement at Maturity of Policy. 
The Insured may elect to have the net sum due under 
said policy upon its maturity applied under one or more 
of the following optional modes of settlement in lieu of 
the lump sum provided for on the first page thereof, and 
in the absence of such an election by the Insured, the 
beneficiary, after the Insured's death, may so elect. The 
beneficiary, after the Insured's death, may designate 
(w~th the right to change such designation) the person 
to whom any amount remaining unpaid at the death of 
the beneficiary shall be paid if there be no such person 
designated by the Insured and surviving. Such election, 
designation or request for change shall be in writing and 
shall not take effect until filed with the Society at its 
I-Iome Office and endorsed upon the policy or the Supple-
mentary Contract, if any." 
Option 1 of the policy provided that the fund should 
be left at interest payable monthly. 
The interest as set out were the amounts under safd 
policies received by her executors. 
Upon the death of Cora E. Fenner the insurance com-
pany paid the principal fund to the residuary beneficiaries 
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-that is to say, under this particular policy-one-sixth 
to Stella Wright Willey, one-sixth to the children of Flora 
Wright Streight, deceased, one-sixth to Melvina Wright 
Downs, one-sixth to Jessica Wright Kinikin, one-sixth to 
Robert G. Wright, and one-sixth to the children of Meral 
E. Wright, deceased. 
Upon the hearing upon the order to show cause and 
upon the answer of the executors, the Court found that 
these principal funds under· these policies were not sub-
ject to inheritance tax in the matter of the estate of Cora 
E. Fenner, deceased. 
The correctness of that decision is before the Court 
· upon this appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
The Tax Commission is contending that the principal 
funds under the:se life insurance policies are taxable under 
the provisions of Section 59-12-3 of the Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953. The provisions of said section are the same 
as in Section 80-12-3 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
This section taxes the property of a deceased when it 
shall p~ss to another. 
(a) by testamentary disposition; 
(b)· ·by law of inheritance or succession of this or any 
other State or Country; 
(c) by :deed, grant, bargain, sale or gift made in con-
templation of death of the grantor, vendor or do-
nor, or in tended to take effect in possession or 
enjoyment at or after his death. 
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These funds did not go to the residuary beneficiaries 
by any of the foregoing means. It did not go to them by 
will, by the laws of succession or by any deed or docu-
ment executed by Cora E. Fenner. It went to them under 
the insurance contract entered into between the insurance 
company and Walter E. Fenner. 
The insurance policies gave Cora E. Fenner the legal 
right to the interest on these funds during her lifetime. 
These interest items were ultimately paid to the executors 
of her estate and returned by the executors as being sub-
ject to tax. 
The writer is of the opinion that the property rights 
of Cora E. Fenner to the principal fund was the right in 
law designated as a "Power of Appointment." 
In support of that conclusion the writer desires to call 
to the attention of the Court that under the Federal Law 
the power of appointment is subject to taxation as pro-
vided by Federal Law. 
I have before me Treasury Decisions from February 
.. 24, 1942, to June 1, 1949, issued by the Treasury Depart-
ment in 1949. On page 8 of that pamphlet the regula-
tions recites: 
"The term 'Power of Appointment' includes all powers 
which are in substance and effect power of appoint-
ment regardless of the nomenclature used in creating 
the power and local property law connotations. For 
example, if a settlor transfers property in trust for the 
life of his wife, with a power in the wife to appro-
priate or consun1e the principal of the trust, the wife 
has a power of appointment." 
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I quote from Corpus Juris Secundum, .Volume 72, 
from article entitled "Powers", Page 400. The first sec-
tion reads as follows: 
"Definition and Nature in General 
A power is an authority whereby a person is em-
powered to dispose of property for his own benefit or 
for the benefit of others and operating on an estate or 
interest vested either in himself or another, such 
authority not being derived out of such estate of in-
terest. 
A 'power', in the sense in which the term is used 
with respect to property, in contradiction to its gen-
eral or unrestricted meaning is defined under the com-
mon law, and under statutes substantially embodying 
the common-law definition as a liberty or authority 
reserved by, or limited to, a person to dispose of real 
or personal property for his own benefit, or for the 
benefit of others, and operating on an estate or in-
terest, vested either in himself or some other person, 
the liberty or authority, however, not being derived 
out of such estate or interest, but overreaching or 
superseding it, either wholly or partially. A power 
is not property or a property right or interest; nor is 
it an estate; it is a personal privilege or capacity, a 
mere authority akin to an agency of limited scope or 
power, under which the donee acts for the donor. It 
is not technically a form of ownership; nor, as dis-
cussed infra paragraph 31, does it of itself imply own-
ership; but it is clearly a right affecting ownership." 
I quote from Volume 41, American Jurisprudence, 
from the article on "Powers" being Section 2 at page 806: 
10 
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"2. Definition and General Nature; Distinctions. 
A power over property is defined as a liberty or 
authority reserved by, or limited to a person to dis-
pose of real or personal property for his own benefit, 
or for the benefit of others, and operation on an estate 
or interest, vested either in himself or in some other 
person; the liberty or authority, however, not being 
derived out of such estate or interest, but overreaching 
or superseding it, either wholly or partially. Such 
a power has also been defined as an authority enabling 
one person to dispose of the interest which is vested 
in another. It has been defined by statute as an 
authority to do some act in relation to lands, or the 
creation of estates therein, or of charges thereon, 
which the owner, granting or reserving such power, 
might himself lawfully perform. Both real and per-
sonal property may be subjected to a power of ap-
pointment. 
A power of appointment is not an absolute right 
of property nor is it an estate, for it has none of the 
elements of an estate. The authority given to the 
donee of a povver of appointment does not vest in hin1 
any estate, interest, or title in the property which is 
the subject of the power. A general power of dispo-
sition existing as a povver does not imply ownership; 
in fact, the existence of such a power, as a technical 
power, excludes the idea of an absolute fee simple in 
the person who possesses the power, although where 
the power is for his own benefit, he has the means of 
acquiring such interest, right, title; and in all cases, 
by the execution of the power, the possession, right, 
1 1 
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title, or interest is altered or divested. A power to 
convey land creates in the donee thereof no right, title, 
or interest in the property to be conveyed. Property 
that passes by power of appointment belongs to the 
donor of the power and not to the donee. Whether a 
power of appointment is or is not exercised, the prop-
erty that was subject to the appointment is not sub-
ject to distribution as part of the estate of the donee. 
The right to appoint the proceeds of a mutual 
benefit certificate has sometimes been treated as in the 
nature of a power of appointment." 
Now let us analyze this contract and special provi-
sions together. 
Paragraph 1 of this special provisions are in the nature 
of an arrow, reading as follows: 
"It is hereby specially provided that settlement of 
the amount becoming due by reason of the death of 
the Insured shall be made with the Insured's wife, 
Cora E. Fenner, if living, as provided in paragraph 2." 
So that paragraph 2 now becomes the standard of 
settlement and the important and vital clause of this in-
surance policy. The first contracting provision under 
paragraph 2 is: 
"The amount becoming due to the Insured's said 
wife under paragraph 1, shall be left on deposit with 
the Society in accordance with Option 1 of the Modes 
of Settlement at Maturity of Policy during her life-
time." 
So that the first contract under this policy is that these 
principal funds shall be left with the insurance company 
during the lifetime of Cora E. Fenner. 
12 
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The next provision is that the interest upon these 
funds shall be paid to Cora E. Fenner monthly. 
The next provision reads as follows: 
"except that said wife shall have the following 
privileges: 
(a) On an interest due date of withdrawing the 
amount held on deposit, or 
(b) At any time of having the amount held on 
deposit paid as a life income in accordance 
with Option 3 of the said Modes of Settle-
ment." 
The next provisions reads as follows: 
"In the event of the death of the Insured's said 
wife, subsequent to the death of the Insured but be-
fore the amount due shall have been paid, the amount 
held under said Option 1, together with any interest 
accrued thereon-shall be divided into the number of 
equal shares as shall provide:" 
One share for each of Insured's said nieces, etc. 
Or said provision reads as follows: 
"In the event of the death of the Insured's said 
wife, subsequent to the death of the Insured but before 
the amount due shall have been paid-the commuted 
value of any unpaid certain installments under Option 
3, shall be divided into the number of equal shares 
that will provide:" 
One share for each of the residuary beneficiaries. 
Except as to the monthly interest, Cora E. Fenner had 
13 
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. no rights under said policy unless and until she exercised 
one of the privileges. 
These policies must be construed as a whole to deter-
mine the legal rights created under them. 
The writer therefore restates that it is his opinion that 
Cora E. Fenner had a "Power of Appointment". 
We now come to the final phase of the argument and 
that is that these principal funds are not taxable in the 
Estate of Cora E. Fenner. 
She had no interest in these funds at the time of her 
death or prior thereto that are taxable under the tax law 
of the State of Utah as that law exists at the present time. 
May I present my thoughts and conclusions from 
analogy. 
The State of Utah has had the basic inheritance tax 
law quoted by appellants for a long time. Until the pass-
ing of the provision of the statute making joint tenancies 
taxable they were not taxable under the prior existing 
law and to make joint tenancies taxable the Legislature 
had to act.· 
In re Cowan's Estate; 
98 Utah 393, 
99 Pac. 2nd 605. 
The writer is somewhat familiar with the Federal 
Estate Tax Law. 
The present original act was passed in September, 
1916. The original act provided that there should be 
included in the gross estate of the decedent property, 
which at the time of his death is subject to the payment 
14 
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of the charges against his estate and property transferred 
in contemplation of death and joint tenancies. 
In 1919 there was added a provision requiring inclu-
sion in the gross estate of a deceased also property "to the 
extent of any property passing under a general power of 
appointment exercised by the decedent ( 1) by will, or (2) 
by deed executed in contemplation of, or intended to take 
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after, his death, 
except in case of a bona fide sale for a fair consideration 
in money or money's worth." 
One Kate Field had a general power of appointment 
of a trust created by her husband. Kate Field died April 
29, 1917, and by her will exercised a general power of 
appointment. The Treasury Department contended that 
property passing under a general power of appointment 
should be included as a portion of the gross estate of a 
decedent appointer. 
The Supreme Court of the United States held that a 
tax on this general power of appointment was unsup-
ported by the taxing act. 
This case U. S. vs. Stanley Field, Exr. Etc. of Kate 
Field, Deceased. 
255 U.S. 257 
65 Law Ed. 617 
41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 256 
18 A. L. R. 1461 
In the foregoing case property passed under a general 
power of appointment duly exercised. 
IS 
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In our case we have privileges in Cora E. Fenner that 
were not exercised, and her death terminated such privi-
leges, in other words, she could not dispose of these funds 
by will. 
With respect to powers of appointment the Federal 
Law remained substantially the same, that is to say that 
it contained a provision taxing the value of the property 
passing under an exercised appointment, until October 
21, 1942. 
By the amendment of 1942, there became includable 
in the gross estate of decedent the value of property sub-
ject to the power of appointment by decedent under cer-
tain conditions, the details of which are very complicated. 
In other words, under the Federal Law prior to 1942 
the standard fixed was that property passing under the 
exercised power of appointment. After 1942, under cer-
tain circumstances an unexercised power of appointment 
became taxable. 
In preparing this brief I have investigated the inherit-
ance tax law of several states and I have found that in 
one way or another various states have provisions taxing 
the powers of appointment, some when exercised, some 
when not, some tax a power of appointment to the estate 
of the donor, some to the donee. I have found that the 
taxing of a power of appointment depends upon specific 
legislative enactment and the construction of the enact-
ment. 
16 
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In California, the inheritance tax law is levied against 
property going by will or succession, or the passing by 
deed in contemplation of death, etc. - property held in 
joint tenancies - life insurance money with a very large 
exemption - property going by power of appointment -
property to an executor under a will in excess of a rea-
sonable compensation. 
The same is the general program in many other states. 
I have concluded that the provisions of such laws 
would not help the Court at this matter. 
The executors therefore submit that the death claims 
of these policies were properly omitted from the inherit-
ance tax report by the executors and that the ruling of the 
District Court should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
17 
WADE M. JOHNSON, 
Attorney for Respondents. 
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